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Th e outcomes of an agent’s actions can be both intentional as well as unintentional, and the 
moral and legal evaluations of an agent’s actions and their particular outcomes oft en depend upon the 
evaluation of the agent’s intent.  However, the role of intent in moral evaluation can be quite diff erent 
from the role of intent in legal evaluation.  As such, I wish to examine the role of intent in terms of 
benevolent actions, and in terms of justice and law.
I believe that the intent of the agent and the outcomes of the action ought to be the focus 
of evaluation in terms of justice and law.  I shall discuss the nature of intentional and unintentional 
action and outcomes in reference to justice and law.  Th e concepts of morality and modern law, though 
diff erent, are frequently intertwined. Oft en, one may think of punishable acts (justice) as immoral 
and praiseworthy acts such as benevolence (morality) as free from punishment.  In this sense one 
might consider law and morality of the same principle; one applied for “bad” behavior, the other 
for “good” behavior.  However, from a philosophical as well as legal standpoint this is not entirely 
accurate.  Many acts that are considered immoral are nonetheless considered outside the realm of 
punishment.  Likewise, many acts, though they may be considered moral, are punishable under law; 
imagine a modern day Robin Hood.  Th ere is, however, a link between justice and morality and this 
ought to be carefully considered.
I will address how one cannot accept moral praise for unintentional outcomes, such as 
unintentionally benefi cent outcomes, and one cannot legally punish for unintentional outcomes, 
which may liken moral praise and legal punishment to two sides of the same principle.  However, I 
believe that they are in fact diff erent concepts established upon diff ering principles.  I will argue that 
law and morality - punishment and praise - are not equivalent.  One must remember that although 
intent and action are bound to both justice and morality, they do not bind justice and morality to one 
another; and there are further principles, mainly motives and duties, which separate law and morality. 
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In this sense, they are not mutually exclusive, and precluding the one is not suffi  cient grounds for 
precluding the other.  Nevertheless, as I will show, the application of each oft en seems consistent with 
that of the other.
To begin, it is necessary fi rst to defi ne the legal terms and their application in modern law.  Th is 
is most appropriately begun by defi ning the modern legal use of intent and action.  Legally, intent is 
the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a prohibited act, and intention is the willingness to 
bring about something deliberate or foreseen.  In this sense, intent is what one wished to do, though 
one may or may not have accomplished this.  One could say, “I intended to hit him, but I missed.” 
Implicitly, one must have at least attempted to bring about the outcome, hence the necessity of the 
state of mind “accompanying an act.”  In other words, to wish someone were dead is not likened to 
intent to kill, and more importantly, intent is not likened to action.1
As for the state of mind, this is defi ned legally as the condition or capacity of a person’s mind. 
Th erefore, intent is best described as the condition or capacity of a person’s mind accompanying an 
act.  In this sense it is not a state of mind as used in common discourse.  Legally, to say I was confused, 
or stressed, is not to say that confusion was your intent.  Th e state of mind is instead very specifi c to 
the action.
Legally, to convict someone, and therefore infl ict punishment, it is necessary to prove the 
presence of mens rea.  Mens rea, of Latin origin, simply means “guilty mind” and is used to describe one 
as having a criminal intent, or intent to actually commit a prohibited act.  Taken strictly, for example, 
it is not enough to have one’s act result in the death of another person, but rather one must also have 
had the intent to kill.
However, one can be held accountable for a variety of intents, not all of which are classifi ed as 
immoral.  For example, there is constructive intent, in which actual intent will be presumed when an 
act leading to the result could have been reasonably expected to cause that result.  In this case, one may 
have intended to push a friend down a staircase merely for a cruel laugh, but could be considered to 
1. Th e following legal terms and defi nitions are gathered from: 1. Bryan A. Garner. Black’s Law Dictionary – second pocket 
edition. (St. Paul: West Group, 2001). in combination with 2. the Oxford Essential Dictionary of Legal Words. (New York: 
Berkeley Publishing Group, 2004).
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have a constructive intent to break the friend’s leg, if in fact a broken leg were to result.  Essentially, the 
result is unintended, but should have been reasonably foreseen.
A second example is general intent, in which one is subject to punishment for the awareness of a 
risk or for the omission of action.  For example, if one were to see a pheasant perched next to a friend, 
yet nonetheless attempted to shoot the pheasant, one would have taken the risk, perhaps an obvious 
risk, of hurting the friend, and would therefore be assumed to have had a general intent to hurt the 
friend, again, if this in fact resulted in hurting the friend.  Likewise, if one were responsible for feeding 
a person and were aware of this responsibility and remembered that it needed to be done, yet did not 
feed the person, one could be held to have had the general intent to kill, if in fact this were to result 
in death.2
It is important here to distinguish intent from motive.  Specifi cally, motive is something that 
leads one to act.  In this sense, intent to commit an act is motivated by something (i.e. money, love, 
etc.), and any one motive can ground an infi nite array of intents.  For example, one can be motivated by 
stress to relax, to exercise, or to eat.  When one discusses intentional conduct, as opposed to motive, one 
discusses situations in which one sets out to accomplish something, and he or she attempts to realize 
that accomplishment exactly as planned.  One has a mental picture in his or her mind, so to speak, of 
precisely how he or she would like things to turn out.  Th ere are no accidents, no complications, no 
side eff ects, just true intent.  Intent is a legal concept that goes beyond motive.3
  Having clarifi ed intent, it is important now to turn to the legal defi nition of act.  To describe an 
act, or an event that happened, is not to describe intention.  An act is something done or performed, 
especially voluntarily, and an action is the process of doing or performing.  Voluntarily, in this case, 
is not to say it must be done with a certain kind of intent, but rather that the act occurred as a result 
2. Such behavior under certain conditions might also be considered willful neglect, defi ned as intentional neglect or deliber-
ate neglect.  Likewise, under certain conditions, this could also be considered passive negligence, defi ned as negligence re-
sulting from a person’s failure or omission in acting.  See negligence, Garner, op. cit., 470.  In this case, however, it is closer to 
negligent homicide, defi ned as the killing of a human being by criminal negligence.  In one example of negligent homicide, 
a husband, aware that his wife was threatening to kill their child, left  her without informing the authorities of the specifi c 
danger to the child, and his wife ultimately killed the child.  Th e negligent act was not his leaving per se, but rather his failure 
to inform the authorities.  H.L.A. Hart. Causation in the Law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959) 333.
3. Oliver Wendell Holmes. Jr. Th e Common Law. (New York: Barnes and Noble Publishing Company, 2004) 95-100.
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of a person’s will being exerted on the external world.4  For instance, if one were to slip and fall into 
someone unintentionally, one has not acted rudely because the occurrence was not the result of his or 
her will being exerted on the external world, but was instead accidental.  On the other hand, one may 
say something rude without intending to act rudely.  However, the act, what he or she has specifi cally 
said, was voluntary.  In both cases there is no intent to bring about the outcome, yet the former is not 
rude, while the latter is rude on account of the voluntary action.5  
As with intent, legality considers a multiplicity of acts.  For example there are intentional acts, 
in which an act is the result of the agent’s will directed to that end, and unintentional acts, in which it 
is not.  Th e act can be identical in both instances.  When act is met with intent and coupled with mens 
rea, a wrongful action can establish criminal liability.  In law, the wrongful action is termed actus reus.6 
If one has not intended the act, one is not subject to the same sort of punishment that one would be 
had one intended the act.
To exemplify, imagine a man standing peacefully inside a store.  Th e man has done nothing 
illegal, and is standing appropriately in line waiting to be served.  A woman enters the store.  In doing 
so, she unintentionally hits the man with the door, thus breaking his nose.  Her intention was simply 
to enter the store, motivated by hunger, but the act resulted in breaking the man’s nose.  Despite the 
breaking of the man’s nose, the woman has not committed a crime; for she did not intend such a 
consequence, and this could not have been reasonably foreseen.  Th erefore, she would not receive 
punishment.
Turning now to morality, it seems that praise follows the exact same principles, and thus the 
same conclusion: unintentional outcomes call neither for punishment nor praise.  To illustrate, image 
a man is being robbed at gunpoint in the store.  Th e woman walking into the store hits the robber with 
the door unintentionally, thus knocking the robber unconscious and freeing the man.  Certainly, the 
4. H.L.A. Hart. Punishment and Responsibility. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968) 28-35.
5. Aristotle, considering this principle, wrote “If a man does [an action] involuntarily, he cannot be said to act justly, or 
unjustly, except incidentally, in the sense that he does an act which happens to be just or unjust.  Whether therefore an action 
is or is not an act of injustice, or of justice, depends on its voluntary or involuntary character.  …it is possible for an act to 
be unjust without being an act of injustice, if the qualifi cation of voluntariness be absent.”  Aristotle. “Nicomachean Ethics, 
Book V.” Th e Great Legal Philosophers: Selected Readings In Jurisprudence. Ed. Clarence Morris. (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1959) 15-39.
6. David M. Adams. Philosophical Problems in the Law – 4th Edition. (Belmont: Th omson-Wadsworth, 2005) 386.
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outcome is favorable to the man, and is a least neutral to the woman, but should she receive praise?  To 
consider this, it is important to turn to the notions of intent and action morally, as opposed to legally. 
Specifi cally, I will consider David Hume7 and Lord Kames.8
To begin, it is necessary to understand Hume’s account of the will in order to understand his 
account of morality.  Hume defi ned the will simply as “the internal impression we feel and are conscious 
of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind.”9  It 
is implicit in Hume’s defi nition of the will that action is any new motion that one knowingly gives rise 
to.10  In this sense, Hume’s defi nition of action is similar to a legally defi ned action.  However, to give 
rise to a motion of the body knowingly, as in the case of the woman who had opened the door to the 
store, is not yet enough to conclude responsibility for the act of saving the man, but merely the action 
of opening the door.
As mentioned, the will is the internal impression accompanying an action, and is likened in 
this sense to legally defi ned intention.  As with legal doctrine, the woman has willed, or intended, to 
open the door.  Th e legal issue here is quite simple; the woman has not violated the law with her act 
or intent, and is therefore free from punishment.  On the other hand, if she hit an innocent man, and 
intended to do so, there would be criminal liability.  However, for Hume, the moral issue is less clear, 
has not been written plainly in statute, and requires more than just the will.11 
Specifi cally, one must draw a connection from the passions and motives, to the will, and fi nally 
to the actions in order to establish the responsibility required for praise or punishment.  If one 
intentionally moves one’s body, but the internal impression one felt and was conscious of was not 
of one’s own account, or not driven by motive, then approbation or disapprobation can hardly be 
justifi ed.  It is thus the case that one cannot rely solely on the will in morality, as with intention in law, 
7. David Hume – (1711-1776) Scottish philosopher, historian, and essayist.
8. Henry Home, Lord Kames – (1696-1792) Scottish philosopher and jurist.
9. David Hume. Treatise of Human Nature. (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1992) 399.
10. I do not address liberty and necessity.  One could ask: is the will free?  If it is not, many would question accountability 
even of “intended” actions, such as in the “dilemma of determinism.”  For the argument at hand this is irrelevant.  Addition-
ally, Hume would nonetheless continue to fi nd accountability in the lack of free will.  In fact, for Hume, it is the necessity of 
the will that truly attaches moral approbation or disapprobation towards one’s actions.  Hume argued that the causal neces-
sity of human actions is not only compatible with moral responsibility but requisite to it.  Ibid., 575.  
11. As mentioned above, legally, intent is the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a prohibited act, and intention is 
the willingness to bring about something deliberate or foreseen.
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and must turn to the passions and motives.  
As mentioned, motive is defi ned legally as something that leads one to act.  Th is, however, is not 
necessary for the purpose of punishment.  One might argue that to say “I killed the man, and I wanted 
to” does not always lead to punishment due to the variety of motives that may have stirred one to kill. 
If one’s motive in this case was to win the battle of Normandy, for example, and the person killed was 
the enemy, then punishment would not be enforced.  However, this is a matter of legality, not motive, 
and it is not illegal to kill an enemy in battle.  In this case, the motive could have been vengeance and 
there would still be no punishment, for battle nonetheless required the killing of the enemy.  Likewise, 
if the act was illegal, the motive would continue to be irrelevant.  For example, if one were to steal 
either due to hunger, or out of spite, in both instances one would be subject to punishment.  In other 
words, it is not the same thing to say “I killed him out of self defense” as to say “I murdered him out of 
self defense.”  Th e motive in both statements is the same, but the legality of the action has changed.12
Returning to Hume, one cannot ignore motive.  For Hume, motives are the driving force behind 
the praise of actions, and actions are merely indicators of the principles of motive.  Th e motive, in this 
sense, is equivalent to passion.  According to Hume, the passions are impressions rather than ideas. 
Th e direct passions - which include desire, aversion, hope, fear, grief, and joy, along with volition - are 
those that are derived immediately from good or evil and from pain or pleasure that we experience or 
think about in prospect.  However, Hume also grouped with them some instincts of unknown origin, 
such as the bodily appetites and the vengeful impulse, which do not proceed from pain and pleasure, 
but instead produce them.  Th e indirect passions, primarily pride, humility, love and hatred, are 
generated in a more complex manner, though the generation nevertheless involves either the thought 
or experience of pain or pleasure.13
Ultimately, the passions drive the will, and thus drive the actions, and are therefore the object 
of moral consideration.  Hume wrote, “’Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only 
12. Dennis Patterson. A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Th eory. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1999) 520-
522.
13. Hume, op. cit., 438-439.  Hume’s complete moral theory appears in Book III of the Treatise of Human Nature and in 
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.  In both works, his theory involves a chain of events that begins with the 
agent’s action, which impacts the receiver, which in turn is observed by the spectator.  I focus here on the establishment of 
the passions, the will, and the action in order to establish responsibility, and to clarify moral intent with legal intent.  
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the motives that produced them, and consider the actions as signs or indicators of certain principles 
in the mind and temper.”14  As such, to fi nd the moral quality, we must not focus on the action, or the 
type of action, but instead look to the motive that produced an action as the object of approbation 
or disapprobation.  Just as an action alone is not criminal in the law, an action alone is not virtuous in 
terms of morality.  
In addition, to praise an action requires that the motive to produce the action be distinct from 
the sense of morality.  Th is is to say that the action is not performed because it is virtuous, and that one 
does not praise the performance of a virtuous action, but that it is virtuous because it is derived from a 
laudable motive, and one ultimately praises the motive.  For example, in the Normandy hypothetical, 
if our hero had been motivated to kill the enemy for a principle of the mind such as the regard for 
safety and world peace, rather than vengeance, then his motive might deserve approbation.  Th e act of 
killing, however, would not.
In this case, the legal issue coincides with the moral issue.  His act receives no punishment, 
and receives praise.  If he had intentionally murdered someone outside of war, his act would receive 
punishment, and would not be praised.  However, the consistency in which praise and punishment are 
applied should not confuse one into thinking they are mutually exclusive.
With this it is necessary to return to the question being considered.  If one is not punished for 
unintended acts, and one cannot receive praise for unintended acts, then do law and morality work 
upon the same fundamental principles?  For Hume, the answer is no.15  With a dependence on motive, 
approbation cannot be bestowed upon someone merely for his or her actions, as punishment cannot 
be bestowed merely for actions.  Unlike the law, however, one cannot receive praise merely for intent. 
Th e praise is for the motive, and thus for Hume, morality and modern law are driven by diff erent 
principles.
14. Ibid., 477.
15. To say that unintended outcomes do not receive praise is not to say that they cannot be good, or benefi cial.  Bernard 
Mandeville argued that vice unintentionally leads to the overall good of society, and thus is both unintended and benefi cial.  
Th e argument here is that they do not receive praise, despite being benefi cial, because the motive is not virtuous.  Implicitly, 
Mandeville argued that it must be vice that drives the unintentional benevolence, and cannot therefore be a virtue.  Ad-
ditionally, as mentioned below, Kames required an action to be benefi cial, but this is merely one part of a complete equation. 
Th e benefi t is a necessary condition of virtue, though not a suffi  cient condition.  Mandeville, Bernard. Th e Fable of the Bees 
and Other Writings. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997).
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To further exemplify, consider two men who have stolen bread, and both intended to steal the 
bread.  In one case, man (a) stole the bread in order to push a competitor out of business.  Clearly, he is 
not going to be the recipient of praise from any reasonable person.  On the other hand, man (b) stole 
the bread in order to feed a dying set of young children.  In this case, praise is likely.  Man (b) has been 
moved to steal by the motive of humanity, whereas man (a) has been moved by malice.  
Nonetheless, both men are susceptible to punishment.  Th ey have both intended to steal, and 
have done so.  Th ough unintended action is neither punishable nor praiseworthy, one can see from this 
example that for Hume the two are not mutually exclusive.  In other words, it is not that if you intend 
an action you are going to receive either punishment or praise, but rather that you may receive one, 
the other, neither, or both.  Th e crucial diff erence is in the motive.  According to Hume, we praise the 
motive.  According to the law, we punish the intent. 
However, this is not universally accepted.  Th ough Kames agreed with Hume in some respects, 
such as the freedom of the will, in other ways they diverged.  For Kames, unlike Hume, approbation is 
a result of four considerations; something is approved of if its perception gives pleasure; if it is fi tted 
for its use - a teleological consideration; if we approve of the end to which it is adapted; and lastly, if 
there was voluntary intention to realize the end.16  Considering this, it is important to note Kames’ 
reliance on intent.  Unlike Hume, intent plays an important role in the establishment of approbation, 
and therefore the establishment of virtuous action.  Specifi cally, Kames noted that the approbation of 
action proceeds from “intention, deliberation, and choice,”17 and it is intention that separates human 
action from the necessary laws of material objects.
Furthermore, having recognized intention, Kames noted that the action itself, or the end, must 
have some value, writing “A benefi cial end strikes us with a peculiar pleasure; and approbation belongs 
also to this feeling.”18  Essentially, Kames believed, similarly to Francis Hutcheson,19 if the intended 
action is benefi cial, then it is approved as fi t to be done.  If it is hurtful, then it is disapproved as unfi t 




19. Francis Hutcheson – (1694 -1746) Scottish moral and political philosopher.
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to be done.  To exemplify, one need only consider the robber.  Th e robber’s actions may benefi t the 
robber, but they certainly do not benefi t the woman, man, or society.  In this sense, the robber’s actions 
would not receive approbation.  
Returning to the woman’s action, it is quite clear that the action itself is approved of, for it 
was certainly benefi cial.  However, taking into account the full scope of Kames’ analysis, it becomes 
clear that the action does not call for praise.  Mainly, as mentioned, it is necessary to account for the 
benefi cial ends of the action, as well as intent.  Th e woman merely intended to enter the store, and did 
not intend to hit the robber.  As such, the action is not entirely virtuous.  Accordingly, one can see that 
unintentionally benefi cent outcomes would not receive praise.
If this is the case, then what separates Kames’ view of morality from the modern law?  Whereas 
Hume based morality on motive, thus distinguishing it from modern law, Kames based it upon intent, 
much like modern law.  However, it is not a feature of morality that distinguishes the two, but rather 
a feature of Kame’s view of the law.
Primarily, Kames distinguished laws from virtues on the basis of duty, which, according to 
Kames, Hume ignored.  Th e laws, in one sense, are virtues, but they are primary virtues that ought 
to be done obligatorily.  Primary virtues include justice, a basis of punishment.  On the other hand, 
virtues such as intentional benevolence and heroism, which are at stake with the woman opening the 
door, are known as secondary virtues that should be done, but are not obligatory.20  Th is division, 
contrived by “the Author of our nature,”21 categorizes the woman’s act as something that should be 
done only as a sort of supererogatory act, whereas the act of the robber ought not to be done by matter 
of duty and obligation.
Kames believed that to make virtues such as intentional benevolence or heroism obligatory, 
and thus to have them fall under the law, would jeopardize the whole of morality.  Essentially, the 
task of always following such law would be impossible, Kames argued, and society would begin to 
disregard all laws and morals.  On the other hand, Kames believed that making duties such as justice 
20. Kames seems to have considered secondary virtues as falling under a sort of prima facie obligation, as opposed to the 
strict obligation of primary virtues.
21. Ibid., 32.
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obligatory is reasonable and could be accomplished.  For example, we can continually refrain from 
theft , maintain contracts, and abstain from murder. One can see here the principle that divides law 
and morality in Kames’ view.  In both law and morality, action is relevant in the sense that it must 
either be good or evil.  However, laws have active duties and ought to be done obligatorily. Intentional 
benevolence and heroism, on the other hand, do not carry this sort of duty, and are supererogatory 
acts that simply should be done.
In conclusion, though the outcome of unintentional action is the same in both law and morality, 
law and morality do not operate on identical principles.  Th e way in which law and morality reach the 
conclusion is diff erent.  Modern law requires mens rea and actus reus in order to establish criminal 
liability.  Th e absence of mens rea is enough to omit punishment.  For Hume, the absence of intent 
is not exactly enough to omit praise, placing motive much higher than intent.  On the other hand, 
Kames saw intent as crucial, and its absence is enough to omit praise.  However, Kames did not liken 
morality to law, distinguishing laws on the basis of obligation and duty.
For both Hume and Kames, law and morality are not driven by the same principles and are not 
mutually exclusive.  It seems rather simple, however, to confuse morality and law.  Both are normative 
systems with norms relating to the avoidance of harm, and much of the law is based on a society’s 
moral principles.  Additionally, there are holes in the laws which require moral analysis to a certain 
degree, and law is oft en a means by which to enforce morality.22
However, there are many diff erences in addition to those mentioned above.  For example, laws 
are the result of a specifi c procedure and are enacted at a specifi c time.  Morality is not.  A legislature 
does not gather periodically to decide what is or is not virtuous.  Additionally, unlike morality, the 
laws are public, and are applied to everyone equally by a specifi c system of courts.  Morals and virtues 
diff er from person to person, and neither consistency nor proper promulgation is guaranteed as is 
justice through modern law.  Furthermore, moral approbation can be felt by any one person towards 
another, but legal punishment cannot be administered by any one person to another.  For example, it 
would be wrong for one, legally, to punish someone else’s child even though his or her behavior might 
22. Patterson, op. cit., 436-439.
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deserve it.  Essentially then, whether one can or cannot receive punishment for unintended actions has 
no bearing on receiving praise for unintended actions.  Morality, though oft en comparable to modern 
law, is driven by its own principles.
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